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NOTES 
 
THE JOBS ACT: INVESTOR PROTECTION, 
CAPITAL FORMATION, AND EMPLOYMENT 
IN AN INCREASINGLY POLITICAL ECONOMY 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 5, 2012, President Obama signed the Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups Act (the JOBS Act or Act).1  The purpose of the Act was “[t]o 
increase American job creation and economic growth by improving access 
to the public capital markets for emerging growth companies.”2 The Act 
sought to lower the cost of raising capital by deregulating current securities 
laws.3 It was passed against the backdrop of a classic struggle of balancing 
free markets with investor protection,4 a debate that was exacerbated by the 
financial crisis and ensuing recession.5 
The main criticism of the Act alleged that decreased regulation would 
lead to decreased investor protection and thus to increased fraud. 6  The 
purpose of this Note is to show that this criticism is misplaced. A more 
legitimate criticism of the Act should question the effect it will have on job 
creation. The Note will accomplish this by arguing that (1) the JOBS Act, 
by deregulating certain securities offerings, will have a positive impact on 
capital formation without significantly impairing investor protection, and 
(2) the Act, as drafted and sold to the public, may not actually increase 
employment. 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the federal securities laws as 
well as the JOBS Act as a whole. Part II examines the background and 
legislative history of three provisions that seem to have caused the most                                                                                                                  
 1. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 
(2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. J. WILLIAM HICKS, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. SECURITIES LAW § 4:2 (2012). 
 5. See, e.g., Enhanced Investor Protection After the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 3 (2011) (statement of David Massey, 
President, North American Securities Administrators Association; Deputy Securities 
Administrator of North Carolina) (discussin g the necessity of the investor protection provisions of 
the Dodd-Frank Act). 
 6. See, e.g., Letter from Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, to U.S. Senators T im Johnson & 
Richard C. Shelby 1 (Mar. 13, 2012), available at http://www.aicpa.org/advocacy/issues 
/do wnloadabledocuments/404b/3-13-12_sec_chm_schapiro_letter_to_johnson.pdf (addressing the 
JOBS Act and explaining how “[t]oo often, investors are the target of fraudulent schemes 
disguised as investment opportunities”); Matt Taibbi, Why Obama’s JOBS Act Couldn’t Suck 
Wo rse, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 9, 2012, 11:53 AM), http://www.rollin gstone.com/politics/blogs 
/taibblog/why-obamas-jo bs-act-couldnt-suck-worse-20120409 (“The ‘Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups Act’ . . . will very nearly legalize fraud in the stock market.”). 
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commentary and controversy. This Part also analyzes the investor 
protection mechanisms the Act provides. Part III discusses additional 
investor protections outside the JOBS Act. In Part IV, this Note evaluates 
the effect the Act will have on job creation and argues that deregulation will 
not lead to a significant increase in employment. Finally, Part V reviews the 
political climate surrounding the JOBS Act and provides some alternative 
explanations of the Act’s true purpose. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS AND 
THE JOBS ACT 
A. THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 
The Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act) requires that all 
securities offered or sold must be registered with the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (the SEC) or must fall under an exemption. 7 The 
cost of registration can be prohibitively expensive, especially for small 
businesses.8 The theory behind the registration process under the Securities 
Act is to provide investors with disclosure, which grants investors access to 
all material information required to make an informed decision. 9 While the 
Securities Act governs a one-time disclosure for initial offerings, the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) requires continued 
disclosure for companies with securities that trade in the secondary market 
and have a certain number of shareholders and assets. 10  As with the 
Securities Act, the goal of the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act 
is to allow investors to accurately value a company’s shares.11 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE JOBS ACT 
The JOBS Act expanded many existing exemptions and created several 
new ones, thereby increasing access to capital for small businesses. Title I 
of the JOBS Act scaled down the reporting requirements of Securities Act 
registration statements for any entity that qualifies as an “emerging growth 
company.”12 This category was defined in extremely broad terms, which                                                                                                                  
 7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c–77e (2012). For an overview of the registration process, see Registration 
Under the Securities Act of 1933, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/regis33.htm (last modified 
Sept. 2, 2011). 
 8. See, e.g., infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 9. The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml 
(last modified Oct. 1, 3013). 
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 78m. 
 11. See, e.g., Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the Courts’ Approach to Disclosure of Earnings 
Projections, Asset Appraisals, and Other Soft Information: Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 
MD. L. REV. 1114, 1118 (1987). 
 12. JOBS Act § 102 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g(a), 78m(a), 78n(i), 78n-1(e); 17 
C.F.R. § 229.402 (2013)). 
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includes any issuer with “total annual gross revenue” of under $1 billion.13 
The continued reporting requirements of the Exchange Act and Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) are also scaled down as long as the company keeps its 
status as an emerging growth company. 14  In addition, such entities are 
allowed to “test the waters” by communicating with qualified institutional 
buyers and institutional accredited investors before a registration statement 
is filed. 15 Draft versions of registration statements can also be submitted to 
the SEC confidentially.16 
Title II of the JOBS Act changed the way private funds, including 
hedge funds,17 private equity funds,18 and venture capital funds,19  will be 
able to offer securities by lifting the previous ban on general solicitation 
and advertising.20 These funds rely on an exemption to the Securities Act 
under Rule 506 of Regulation D.21  In order to claim the exemption, the 
securities must only be sold to accredited investors.22  
                                                                                                                 
 13. Id. § 101(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(19)). 
 14. Id. §§ 102–04 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g(a), 78m(a), 78n(i), 78n-1(e), 
7213(a)(3), 7262(b)). “Emerging gro wth company” is defined in the Securities Act at 15 U.S.C.  
§ 77b(a)(19) and in the Exchange Act at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80). 
 15. JOBS Act  § 105(c) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77e(d)). 
 16. Id. § 106(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77f(e)). 
 17. The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets explains: 
 
The term “hedge fund” is commonly used to describe a variety of different types of 
investment vehicles that share some common characteristics. Although it is not statutorily 
defined, the term encompasses any pooled investment vehicle that is privately organized, 
administered by professional money managers, and not widely available to the public.  
 
PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF 
LONG-T ERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 1 (1999) [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP.], 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/hedgfund.pdf. 
 18. Private equity funds invest in, by definition, private equity. These are  
 
[e]quity securities of companies that have not “gone public” (are not listed on a public 
exchange). Private equities are generally illiquid and thought of as a long-term investment. As 
they are not listed on an exchange, any investor wishing to sell securities in private 
companies must find a buyer in the absence of a marketplace.  
 
Private Equity, VCE XPERTS, https://vcexperts.com/encyclopedia/glossary/private-equity (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
 19. “An investment fund that manages money from investors seeking private equity stakes in 
startup and small- and medium-size enterprises with strong growth potential. These investments 
are generally characterized as high-risk/high-return opportunities.” Venture Capital Funds, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/vcfund.asp#axzz297tOK0an (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2013). 
 20. JOBS Act § 201 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d; 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144A(d)(1), 
.506 (2013)). 
 21. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. This Note will focus mainly on hedge fun ds rather than all 
private funds. 
 22. Id.; see infra note 40 (defining “accredited investor”). 
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Title III of the Act created a brand new exemption to securities laws by 
allowing companies to raise money through “crowdfunding” platforms.23 
This is accomplished through websites that allow businesses to raise up to 
$1 million from a large number of investors.24 Although each contribution 
may be small, the Internet allows a business owner to reach an unlimited 
number of investors, and thus crowdfunding may revolutionize the way 
small businesses raise capital. The website must register with the SEC as 
either a broker-dealer or a “funding portal.”25 
Title IV of the Act amended section 3(b) of the Securities Act by 
creating a new class of exempted securities for small businesses that are 
raising a limited amount of capital. 26 Prior to the Act, a similar exemption 
existed under Regulation A.27 The new exemption created under the JOBS 
Act, dubbed Regulation A+, 28  has been viewed as an expansion of 
Regulation A, although it is technically a new exemption.29 The JOBS Act 
increased the amount of money that may be raised in these offerings from 
$5 million to $50 million. 30 The issuer may rely on general solicitation, and 
the securities may be freely resold, but the issuer must comply with several 
requirements, which include providing investors with a simplified offering 
circular and simplified financial statements.31 
Titles V and VI amended sections 12(g) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act 
by raising the threshold of shareholders for mandatory registration. 32 
Registration with the SEC is required from companies with over $10 
million in assets and over 2000 shareholders, increased from 500.33 Lastly, 
Title VII simply instructs the SEC to make information regarding the JOBS 
                                                                                                                 
 23. JOBS Act §§ 301–05 (codified as amen ded at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(6), 77d-1, 77r(b)(4), 
(c)(1), (c)(2)(F), 78c(a)(80), (h), 78l(g)(6), 78o(i)(2)). 
 24. Id. § 302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6)). 
 25. Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the Securities 
Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 
N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1753–54 (2012). See infra note 90 (defining “funding portal”). 
 26. JOBS Act § 401 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)). 
 27. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–63 (2013). 
 28. Louis A. Bevilacqua et al., JOBS Act Targets Smaller Business Capital Raising, 
PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP 4 (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.pillsburylaw.com 
/siteFiles/Publications/CSAlertJumpstartOurBusinessesAct040512_final.pdf. 
 29. See, e.g., Rob Kaplan & Tom Voekler, Beyond Crowdfunding: Why Regulation A Reform 
Is the Most Vital Piece of the JOBS Act, WASH. POST (June 13, 2012), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-13/business/35459353_1_initial-public-offerings-
investors-jobs-act (“The JOBS Act expands Regulation A’s annual dollar limit tenfold—from $5 
million to $50 million.”). 
 30. JOBS Act § 401 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)(A)). 
 31. Id. See also Small Business and the SEC, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus 
/qasbsec.htm (last modified Oct. 10, 2013) (providing an overview of Regulation A). 
 32. JOBS Act §§ 501, 601 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l(g)(1), (4), (5)(A), 
78o(d)). 
 33. Id. T itle VI and section 15(d) apply to banks and bank holdin g companies; T itle V an d 
section 12(g) apply to companies other than banks and bank holding companies. Id. 
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Act available online and to direct this information towards small businesses 
and those owned by minorities, women, and veterans.34 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE JOBS ACT’S PROVISIONS AND 
RESULTANT INVESTOR PROTECTION MECHANISMS 
The three provisions of the JOBS Act analyzed here came about for 
slightly different reasons, but all were passed with the general intent of 
increasing small businesses’ access to capital and increasing employment.35 
Although these provisions seek to ease the requirements for certain 
companies issuing equity, several of the Act’s requirements seek to limit 
the scope of each provision and safeguard investors.36 
A. TITLE II: PRIVATE FUNDS AND THE LIFTING OF THE BAN ON 
GENERAL SOLICITATIONS 
i. Background and Legislative History 
Hedge funds, although not a new concept, have seen substantial growth 
in recent years.37  This growth, combined with the government’s lack of 
information regarding their operations,38 led to several proposals in the last 
decade to regulate the industry.39 For many years hedge funds have been 
able to avoid registration under the Securities Act by not offering their 
securities publicly, not advertising or engaging in general solicitation, and 
only selling to accredited investors.40 Funds can also avoid the requirements 
of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act 
of 1940 by limiting the number of beneficial owners and requiring investors 
to meet investment minimums and the definition of a “qualified 
purchaser.”41 
Although much of the commentary on Title II of the JOBS Act focuses 
on hedge funds, the original legislative intent does not appear to consider                                                                                                                  
 34. Id. § 701. 
 35. See infra Part II.A–C. 
 36. Id. 
 37. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP., supra note 17, at 1. 
 38. STAFF OF SEC, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROW TH OF HEDGE FUNDS vii (2003) [hereinafter 
STAFF REPORT], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefun ds0903.pdf. 
 39. Pallavi Gogoi & Barbara Hagen baugh, Geithner Seeks More Hedge Fund Regulations, 
USA T ODAY (Mar. 27, 2009, 11:26 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/companies 
/regulation/2009-03-26-hedge-funds-regulationt-geithner_N.htm; Registration Under the Advisers 
Act of Certain Hedge Fun d Advisers, Advisers Act Release No. 2266, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 
10, 2004). 
 40. STAFF REPORT, supra note 38, at x. “Accredited investor” is defined by Rule  501(a) of the 
Securities Act. Besides certain institutional investors and insiders of the issuer, a natural person 
may be accredited if he has a net worth of more than $1 million or has income of more than 
$200,000 in each of the previous two years and a reasonable expectation of the same income level 
for the current year. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2013). 
 41. STAFF REPORT, supra note 38, at x. 
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this sector of the financial industry. The bill was introduced by 
Representative Kevin McCarthy as the Access to Capital for Job Creators 
Act, which “would improve capital formation by expanding financing 
options”42—a purpose couched in general terms not unlike the JOBS Act as 
a whole. The justification for the bill was that, due to the heightened 
lending standards resulting from the financial crisis, traditional commercial 
bank loans were increasingly difficult to obtain by small businesses.43 
Congressional testimony of industry experts favored the proposal, asserting 
that raising capital under the current regulation was too burdensome, as a 
ban on general solicitation meant that investors needed a preexisting 
relationship with the issuer. 44  Furthermore, because these investors were 
required to qualify as accredited, they typically had a bigger appetite for 
risk and needed fewer protections than less wealthy or sophisticated 
investors.45 
Still, a problem remained—although purchasers would need 
accreditation status, allowing advertising and general solicitation would 
result in offers being extended to unaccredited investors, who might then 
mislead the issuer as to their true level of wealth or sophistication. 46 To 
assuage these concerns, the bill was amended to include a provision 
directing the SEC to adopt rules requiring “the issuer to take reasonable 
steps to verify that purchasers of the securities are accredited investors.”47 
ii. Investor Protection Mechanisms 
Despite these safeguards, critics warned that the proposed SEC rules 
threatened to undermine investor protection. 48 These new rules for hedge 
funds come at a time when, for many years, proposals have been made to 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Access to Capital for Job Creators Act, H.R. 2940, 112th Cong. (2012); Digest for H.R. 
2940, HOUSE REPUBLICAN CONF., http://www.gop.gov/bill/112/1/hr2940 (last visited Nov. 17, 
2013). 
 43. H.R. REP. NO. 112-263, at 2 (2011). 
 44. Legislative Proposals to Facilitate Small Business Capital Formation and Job Creation: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on 
Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 35–36 (2011) [hereinafter Legislative Proposals Hearing] (statement of 
Barry E. Silbert, Founder & CEO, SecondMarket). 
 45. Id. at  123; but see Pat Huddleson, Keeping Vigilant for Investment Fraud, PHYSICIAN’S 
MONEY DIG. (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.physiciansmoneydigest.com/personal-finance/Keeping-
Vigilant-for-Investment-Fraud (noting that doctors are often targets of investment fraud because 
of their high wealth levels and lack of financial expertise). 
 46. Legislative Proposals Hearing, supra note 44, at 64 (statement of Heath Abshure, 
Arkansas Securities Commissioner and Chairman of the Corporation Finance Committee of the 
North American Securities Administration Association).  
 47. H.R. REP. NO. 112-263, at 1 (2011); 157 CONG. REC. H7290 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 2011) 
(statement of Rep. Waters). 
 48. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Senator Carl Levin, Levin Statement on SEC’s Proposed 
General Solicitation Rule (Aug. 29, 2012), available at http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom 
/press/release/levin-statement-on-secs-proposed-general-solicitation-rule. 
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increase, not decrease, regulation of the hedge fund industry. 49 There are 
several valid reasons why regulating hedge funds is not a high priority. 
First, despite their recent growth, hedge funds remain a relatively small part 
of the financial sector.50 In a 2007 speech, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben 
Bernanke disagreed with these proposals for increased regulation and 
argued that the invisible hand of the market would regulate itself. 51  He 
noted that “[t]hus far, the market-based approach to the regulation of hedge 
funds seems to have worked well, although many improvements can still be 
made.”52 This is not to say that hedge funds can never pose systemic risk to 
the financial system.53 In 1998, a hedge fund run by Long Term Capital 
Management nearly collapsed.54  A failure of the fund could have had a 
broader impact on the already fragile financial markets.55 Nine years later, 
the subprime mortgage crisis led to the near collapse of two hedge funds at 
Bear Stearns,56  which was one factor that led to the firm’s fire sale to 
JPMorgan eight months later.57 
Even if regulators agreed that hedge funds posed too great a risk, 
increased regulation would pose several problems. First, it is not clear that 
increased regulation would even be able to contain risk in the industry, or 
whether it would disrupt the existing market-based discipline.58 A balanced 
proposal is that while highly burdensome regulations may not be in the 
economy’s best interest, regulations should, at a minimum, try to 
understand the industry better. This decrease in opaqueness would allow for 
a more tailored oversight regime. However, hedge funds are notoriously 
secretive,59 and by making more information publicly available, the effect                                                                                                                  
 49.  See, e.g., Gogoi & Hagenbaugh, supra note 39. 
 50. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP., supra note 17, at 1. 
 51. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at New York University Law School: 
Financial Regulation and the Invisible Hand (Apr. 11, 2007), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070411a.htm. 
 52. Id. 
 53. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP., supra note 17, at 2 (“Although individually and as an 
industry, hedge funds represent a relatively small segment of the market, their impact is greatly 
magnified by their highly active trading strategies and by the leverage obtained through their use 
of repurchase agreements and derivative contracts.”). 
 54. Id. at  12–14. 
 55. Id. at  20. 
 56. Julie  Creswell & Vikas Bajaj, $3.2 Billion Move by Bear Stearns to Rescue Fund, N.Y. 
T IMES (June 23, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/23/business/23bond.html. 
 57. Yalman Onaran, JPMorgan Chase to Buy Bear Stearns for $240 Million, BLOOMBERG 
(Mar. 17, 2008, 12:54 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid 
=a4qrSYRFeOgI. 
 58. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta’s 2006 Financial Markets Conference: Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (May 16, 2006), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20060516a.htm (“A risk 
of any prescriptive regulatory regime is that, by creating moral hazard in the marketplace, it  leaves 
the system less rather than more stable.”). 
 59. Michael S. Schmidt, A Trader’s Train to Wall Street, Conn., N.Y. T IMES (Aug. 4, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/04/business/04reverse.html. 
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may be to decrease funds’ competitive advantage, which again would 
distort the current laissez-faire environment.60 Thus, the benefits of hedge 
funds would be reduced. 
Once the disadvantages of increased regulation are understood, the next 
step is to focus on determining the effects of decreased regulation. Critics to 
the Act contend that allowing private funds to solicit to the general public 
will cause unsophisticated investors to be inundated with advertisements 
and offers for funds, which will lead to increased fraud. 61  However, as 
mentioned, hedge funds prefer to remain out of the public eye.62 This aspect 
of the industry is even more evident as the financial crisis has brought 
negative attention to the financial sector and the “one percent” of wealthy 
Americans. 63  For this reason, some commentators have speculated that 
private funds may not wish to advertise.64 
Another concern is whether increasing the solicitation opportunities of 
these private funds will result in larger numbers of investments in such 
funds as investors divert funds that ordinarily would have been invested in 
safer vehicles such as mutual funds or tax-qualified accounts such as IRAs 
or 401(k)s.65 Private funds are often riskier than traditional funds and have 
much less liquidity, making it more difficult for investors to access their 
funds for extended periods of time.66 However, many hedge funds already 
have more than enough capital and often must turn away new investors.67 
Additionally, hedge funds are typically only available to accredited 
                                                                                                                 
 60. See Bernanke, supra note 58 (“If several funds had similar positions, how wo uld 
authorities avoid giving a competitive advantage to one fund over another in using the information 
from the database?”). 
 61. See, e.g., Ronald D. Orol, Regulator Fears Fraud from Hedge-Fund Ad Rules, WALL ST. J. 
MARKETWATCH, (Nov. 15, 2012, 1:42 PM), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2012-11-15 
/economy/35126471_1_angel-investors-angel-capital-association-hedge-fund. 
 62. See, e.g., Phil Niles, The JOBS Act: Why It May Mean Nothing for Hedge Funds, 
FINALTERNATIVES (June 11, 2012, 8:05 AM), http://www.finalternatives.com/node/20741; see 
also Schmidt, supra note 59. 
 63. See, e.g., Talking About a Revolution: Occupy Wall Street and the Media, ECONOMIST, 
Apr. 7, 2012, at 92, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21552179. 
 64. See, e.g., Hedge Fund Industry Cautious on JOBS Act, COOCONNECT (July 12, 2013), 
http://cooconnect.com/news/hedge-fund-in dustry-cautious-jobs-act (quoting Charlie Nightingale, 
senior counsel and head of legal and investment structuring at PAAMCO). 
 65. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, The Risks of Tapping Your Retirement Fund for Alternative 
Investments, N.Y. T IMES, Oct. 31, 2012, at B10, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10 
/30/the-risks-of-tapping-a-retirement-fund-for-an-alternative-use/. 
 66. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP., supra note 17, at 3 (noting that hedge funds offer greater 
returns, but also greater risk, than other investment benchmarks). Hedge funds frequently limit 
redemptions by investors, a practice referred to as putting up a “gate.” See, e.g., Juliet Chung & 
Gregory Zuckerman, Salient Says Fund Halts Investor Withdrawals, WALL ST.  J. (Oct. 27, 2012, 
2:07 PM), available at http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424052970204098704578081262215522792.html. 
 67. Niles, supra note 62. 
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investors,68 making it unlikely that the average person would have access to 
these investments. 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd-Frank or the Dodd-Frank Act) is an additional safeguard on the 
hedge fund industry.69 As part of the overall effort to regulate hedge funds, 
or at least to increase their transparency, Dodd-Frank requires that hedge 
funds now register with the SEC and increases the amount of information 
reported to the agency.70 The Act also allows the SEC to conduct audits and 
collect information on systemic risk.71 
B. TITLE III: USING CROWDFUNDING PORTALS TO RAISE CAPITAL 
THROUGH THE INTERNET 
i. Background and Legislative History 
The JOBS Act, by improving access to capital, addressed a problem 
present in many small businesses. That is, when raising capital, the cost of 
compliance with securities regulations may outweigh the benefit of the 
financing.72 One proposed solution was crowdfunding: 
The concept of crowdfunding finds its root in the broader concept of 
crowdsourcing, which uses the “crowd” to obtain ideas, feedback and 
solutions in order to develop corporate activ ities. In the case of 
crowdfunding, the objective is to collect money for investment; this is 
generally done by using social networks, in part icular through the Internet 
(Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn and different other specialized blogs). . . . In 
other words, instead of raising the money from a very s mall group of 
sophisticated investors, the idea of crowdfunding is to obtain it  from a 
large audience (the “crowd”), where each individual will provide a very 
small amount.73 
Although crowdsourcing is attractive to small business startups, the 
securities laws prior to the JOBS Act did not contain an exemption for such 
a financing method.74 Rule 506 of Regulation D, discussed in Part II.A, was 
not a possibility before the JOBS Act because of the ban on general 
                                                                                                                 
 68. See supra note 40 (defining “accredited investor”). 
 69. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C. (2012)). 
 70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-2(a), -3(b), -4(b). 
 71. Id. § 80b-4. 
 72. Joan MacLeod Hemin way & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: 
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 T ENN. L. REV. 879, 880 (2011). 
 73. Id. at  881 (quoting Paul Belleflamme et. al, Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd 2 
(CORE Discussion Paper No. 2011/32, 2011), available at http://www2.dse.unibo.it/dsa/seminari 
/610/Crowdfunding_BLS_13Feb2011.pdf). 
 74. Hazen, supra note 25, at 1744–49.  
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solicitation and advertising. 75  Even after the Act lifted this ban, the rule 
requires that all purchasers be accredited investors, and issuers must take 
reasonable steps to verify such accreditation.76  Rules 504 and 505 have 
similar problems, which include bans on general solicitation, accreditation 
standards, and a restricted securities status, meaning the securities may not 
be freely resold by purchasers.77 Regulation A, discussed in Part II.C, is 
another exemption for small businesses that allows for general 
solicitation. 78 Although the exemption does not require issuers to complete 
the full registration process, some financial statements and offering 
circulars must be filed,79 the cost of which may not be conducive for a small 
startup seeking limited funding.80 
ii. Investor Protection Mechanisms 
Crowdfunding became explicitly legal through Title III of the JOBS 
Act.81 Several requirements pertaining to funding amounts must be met in 
order to rely on this exemption. The Act limits the aggregate amount of 
capital raised through the offering during any twelve-month period to $1 
million. 82  The Act also limits the amount that may be sold to any one 
investor.83 If either the annual income or net worth of the investor is less 
than $100,000, that investor may only invest up to the greater of $2000 or 
five percent of his annual income or net worth.84 If either the annual income 
or net worth is greater than $100,000, the investor may not invest more than 
ten percent of his annual income or net worth, and in no instance may he 
invest more than $100,000.85 
Congress had at least two purposes in drafting the investment limits.86 
First, the general concept of crowdfunding was a response to the demand of 
startups and small businesses for which the traditional methods of capital 
raising were not accessible.87 By allowing these companies to seek funding 
from the “wisdom of the crowd,” businesses could seek small investments 
                                                                                                                 
 75. 17 C.F.R.  § 230.502(c) (2013) (to be amended by JOBS Act § 201, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 
126 Stat. 306, 313 (2012)). 
 76. JOBS Act § 201(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306, 313 (2012) (codified as 
amended at 17 C.F.R. § 230.506). 
 77. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504–05. 
 78. Id. §§ 230.251–63. 
 79. Id. §§ 230.252–53. 
 80. See infra Part II.C. 
 81. JOBS Act §§ 301–05 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(a)(6), 77d-1, 77r(b)(4), 
(c)(1), (c)(2)(F), 78c(a)(80), (h), 78l(g)(6), 78o(i)(2)). 
 82. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A). 
 83. See id. § 77d(a)(6)(B). 
 84. Id. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i). 
 85. Id. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(ii). 
 86. See 157 CONG. REC. S8458 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jeff Merkley). 
 87. Id. 
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from a large number of investors. 88  Second, by explicitly limiting the 
investment amount, Congress limited the exposure and thus the risk borne 
by any individual investor.89 
A further condition requires that the transactions take place through an 
intermediary designated as a broker or “funding portal,”90 either of which 
must be registered with the SEC.91  Both the issuer and intermediary are 
subject to additional requirements.92 For example, an intermediary may not 
compensate promoters or lead generators for providing identifying 
information of any potential investor. 93  The issuer, in keeping with the 
overall goal of disclosure and transparency, must register certain 
information with the SEC pertaining to the identity of the issuer and its 
officers,94 the financial condition of the company,95 and a description of the 
nature and purpose of the offering; 96  this information must be made 
available to investors as well. 97  The importance of these registrations 
becomes more apparent due to a private cause of action created by the 
statute: issuers are liable to investors for any material misstatements or 
omissions.98 
C. TITLE IV: REGULATION A+ OFFERINGS FOR SMALL BUSINESSES 
i. Background and Legislative History 
Regulation A+ increased the amount of capital available through a 
limited offering from $5 million to $50 million.99 One of the main reasons 
for increasing this ceiling was that very few companies were actually using                                                                                                                  
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. 
 90.  “Funding portal” is a new term defined by section 3(a)(80) of the Exchange Act: 
 
The term “funding portal” means any person acting as an intermediary in a transaction 
involving the offer or sale of securities for the account of others, solely pursuant to section 
4(6) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77d(6)) that does not— (A) offer investment 
advice or recommendations; (B) solicit  purchases, sales, or offers to buy the securities offered 
or displayed on its website or portal; (C) compensate employees, agents, or other persons for 
such solicitation or based on the sale of securities dis- played or referenced on its website or 
portal; (D) hold, manage, possess, or otherwise handle investor funds or securities; or (E) 
engage in such other activities as the Commission, by rule, determines appropriate.  
 
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(80) (2012). 
 91. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(1). The broker or funding portal must be registered, not the securities 
themselves. 
 92. Id. § 77d-1. 
 93. Id. § 77d-1(a)(10). 
 94. Id. § 77d-1(b)(1)(A)–(C). 
 95. Id. § 77d-1(b)(1)(D). 
 96. Id. § 77d-1(b)(1)(E). 
 97. Id. § 77d-1(b)(1). 
 98. Id. § 77d-1(c). 
 99. Id. § 77c(b)(2)(A). 
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the exemption. 100 Although Regulation A is an exemption to the traditional 
registration process, it still requires that some financial statements and 
offering circulars be prepared and filed with the SEC, albeit a much less 
rigorous process than a full public offering.101 Because of this, the process 
is sometimes referred to as a “mini-registration.”102 However, this results in 
an offering cost which, when combined with the $5 million limit, becomes 
prohibitively expensive.103  By some estimates, between three and seven 
companies completed Regulation A offerings in 2010.104 Indeed, Congress 
had this issue in mind previously and has raised the initial exemption of 
$100,000 several times.105  The ceiling was raised to $300,000 in 1945, 
$500,000 in 1972, $2 million in 1978, and $5 million in 1980.106 The new 
Regulation A+ contains a similar provision that allows the SEC to review 
the amount every two years and raise the maximum if necessary.107 
The purpose behind the original Regulation A exemption, like the 
purpose behind the JOBS Act, was to grant small businesses easier access 
to capital. 108 Small businesses are an integral part of the economy,109 but the 
current state of the credit markets makes it difficult for many to obtain 
financing. 110 Regulation A+ lowers many of the barriers to capital raising 
that were present in its predecessor.111 The Act raises the cap of the offering 
from $5 million to $50 million.112 Further, Regulation A+ securities will be 
treated as “covered” securities, meaning they will be exempt from state blue 
sky laws if they are listed on a national exchange or if offers and sales are 
made to “qualified purchasers.”113                                                                                                                  
 100. See SEC Advisory Comm. on Small & Emerging Buss., Presentation Slides (Oct. 31, 
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec 
/acsec103111presentation.pdf. 
 101. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251–63 (2013). 
 102. Harvey Frank, The Processing of Small Issues of Securities Under Regulation A, 1962 
DUKE L.J. 507, 508. 
 103. Id. at  507. 
 104. H.R. REP. NO. 112-206, at 3 (2011); SEC Advisory Comm. on Small & Emerging Buss., 
supra note 100. 
 105. H.R. REP. NO. 112-206, at 3. 
 106. Id. Although Congress authorized the SEC to use the $5 million maximum in 1980, the 
SEC did not actually raise it  to this level until 1992. Id. 
 107. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(5). 
 108. Frank, supra note 102, at 507. 
 109. H.R. REP. NO. 112-206, at 4 (2011); see also Council of Econ. Advisers,  Annual Report of 
the Council of Economic Advisers, in ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 7, 67 (2012) 
[hereinafter Council of Econ. Advisers], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default 
/files/microsites/ERP_2012_Complete.pdf. 
 110. Small Business Lending: Field Hearing Before the Cong. Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. 19 
(2010) (statement of Robert Blaney, Arizona District Director, U.S. Small Business 
Administration). 
 111. See JOBS Act § 401; 17 C.F.R. § 251–63 (2013). 
 112. JOBS Act § 401. 
 113. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D). “Qualified purchasers” is a term to be defined by the SEC. Id.  
§ 77r(b)(4)(D)(ii). 
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As with the old Regulation A, the securities may be publicly sold.114 
The securities may also be resold freely by the purchaser. 115  Another 
provision included from the old Regulation A allows issuers to “test the 
waters” by soliciting interest before filing the offering statement.116 
ii. Investor Protection Mechanisms 
The increased availability of the exemption has led to criticism that 
fewer requirements for raising capital will lead to an increase in fraud.117 
Although many provisions favor issuers, the Act also includes some 
protections for investors. First, issuers must provide audited financial 
statements with the offering circulars and must file updated audited 
financial statements with the SEC annually.118 The SEC can also require the 
issuers to file and disseminate non-financial information such as a 
discussion of business operations and corporate governance principals.119 
Regulation A only requires unaudited financial statements, and those 
statements need to be filed once, rather than continuously.120 
Second, although the JOBS Act grants certain Regulation A+ offerings 
an exemption from blue sky laws, the exemption only applies if the 
securities are listed on a national exchange or sold only to qualified 
investors;121 therefore, many Regulation A+ offerings will still be subject to 
state securities laws. The Act also requires that a study be performed on the 
effect of blue sky laws on Regulation A+ offerings,122 which may affect 
SEC rulemaking in the future.123 
Third, a disqualification rule exists for certain “bad actors.” 124 
Regulation A has a similar provision under Rule 262, which bars issuers, 
affiliates, or underwriters who are subject to administrative orders or 
injunctions involving certain securities laws from utilizing the 
exemption.125 Certain criminal convictions also prevent a party from using 
the exemption.126  Regulation A+ directs the SEC to promulgate a rule 
substantially similar to regulations found in the Dodd-Frank Act, which                                                                                                                  
 114. Id. § 77c(b)(2)(B). 
 115. Id. § 77c(b)(2)(C). 
 116. Id. § 77c(b)(2)(E). 
 117. H.R. REP. NO. 112-206, at 13 (2011). 
 118. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)(F). 
 119. Id. § 77c(b)(2)(G)(i). 
 120. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251–63 (2013). 
 121. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D). 
 122. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 402, 126 Stat. 306, 325 (2012). 
 123. Benjamin M. Hron, JOBS Act May Make It Easier for Emerging Companies to Raise 
Capital, MCCARTER & ENGLISH, LLP (Apr. 2012), http://www.mccarter.com/files/Uploads 
/Images/EmergingBusinessAlert_Apr2012.pdf. 
 124. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)(G)(ii). 
 125. 17 C.F.R. § 230.262. 
 126. Id. 
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prohibit certain actors from using Rule 506. 127  Practitioners have 
recommended that the SEC amend Rule 262, which applies to Regulation A 
offerings, to conform to the new rule concerning Regulation A+ 
offerings.128 
III. INVESTOR PROTECTIONS OUTSIDE THE JOBS ACT 
COMMON TO ALL EXEMPTIONS 
A. EXTRA-STATUTORY MECHANISMS: NEGOTIATION AND 
VALUATION IN SMALL BUSINESS INVESTMENTS 
In addition to the investor protections built into the JOBS Act, the 
current investing environment provides several other safeguards. Investing 
in a small business is usually done through an arm’s-length transaction; 
investors will do their own due diligence and understand the risks.129 
Indeed, investing in small businesses is inherently risky—a majority of 
small businesses fail within a few years.130 However, risk is valued into 
investment: the riskier the proposition, the less investors will be willing to 
pay for it (through lower share prices for equity investments), and the more 
protections they will demand (through higher interest rates and other 
covenants for loans).131 As a result, some companies are choosing to go 
beyond what the JOBS Act requires.132 Unlike Titles II, III, and IV, which 
still require SEC rulemaking in order to be implemented, Title I of the 
JOBS Act went into effect immediately.133 From the time that the Act was                                                                                                                  
 127. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)(G)(ii); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d). 
 128. Letter from Catherine T . Dixon, Chair, Fed. Regulation of Sec. Comm., Bus. Law Section, 
Am. Bar Ass’n, to SEC 10–11 (Sept. 7, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-
tit le-iv/jobstitleiv-13.pdf. 
 129. See Claudia Lin g-Yun Zhang, How to Solve the Dilemma of Small Business Finance: A 
Proposal for Credito rs’ Statutory Information Right, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 129, 145 (2012) 
(analyzing the “corporate obligations to creditors, particularly how variations on statutory 
protection depend on bargaining bet ween contracting parties”); Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a 
Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1068–
76 (2003) (noting that venture capital firms are uniquely situated to take on the risk of start-up 
financing and observing how venture capital contracting addresses the problems of uncertainty, 
information asymmetry, and agency costs). 
 130. A Consumer’s Guide to Small Business Investments, WASH. ST. DEP’T FIN. INSTITUTIONS, 
http://dfi.wa.gov/sd/sbinvestments.htm (last updated Jan. 29, 2010). 
 131. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is a theory of modern finance which uses risk 
and expected return to value an investment. For a discussion of this theory and others, see Samuel 
C. Thompson, Jr., A Lawyer’s Guide to Modern Valuation Techniques in Mergers and 
Acquisitions, 21 J. CORP. L. 457, 460 (1996). 
 132. See Jessica Holzer, Some Firms Shun Looser IPO Rules, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 14, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324595904578117322881014396.html. Fifty-
five eligible companies were used in the calculation. Id. 
 133. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 101–08, 126 Stat. 306, 307 (2012) (codified in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); JOBS Act Implementation Update: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Investigations, Oversight and Regulations of the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 113th Cong. 35 
(2013) (statements of Lona Nallengara, Acting Director, Division of Corporation Finance, and 
John Ramsay, Acting Director, Division of Trading & Markets, SEC). 
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passed in April 2012 until November of the same year, eighty-five percent 
of companies who were eligible to qualify as an “emerging growth 
company” chose not to use the less demanding reporting requirements 
because the cost savings did not outweigh the negative perception from 
investors, who would attach a lower valuation to the security.134 If investors 
lack confidence because of a perception of increased fraud, then the cost of 
capital would actually increase, which in turn would hurt job growth.135 
Interestingly, this suggests that the JOBS Act may not achieve its intended 
purpose. 
B. STATUTORY MECHANISMS UNDER EXISTING SECURITIES LAWS 
Existing securities laws provide some potential protections for investors 
that remain in effect after the passage of the JOBS Act. Even if a securities 
offering is exempt from registration requirements, the anti-fraud provisions 
of the securities laws still apply. 136  However, such protections are not 
without limitation. The SEC is authorized to bring civil actions seeking 
injunctions or damages for violations of the securities laws.137 However, the 
resources of the agency are limited, and enforcement actions may not 
uncover all ongoing violations or deter future offenses.138  The Securities 
Act also provides investors with private causes of action under certain 
circumstances.139 However, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 heightened the pleading standard for some such claimants. 140  One 
private action arises in section 11 of the Securities Act, under which an 
issuer is liable for an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in a 
registration statement.141 Purchasers are required to prove neither reliance                                                                                                                  
 134. Holzer, supra note 132. 
 135. Id. (“[T]he law would have the perverse effect of hurting job growth because it  would 
cause investors to place a lower value on companies that cut back on disclosures. That would, in 
turn, raise their cost of capital.”). 
 136. See, e.g., Harry S. Gerla, Issuers Raising Capital Directly from Investors: What Disclosu re 
Does Rule 10b-5 Require?, 28 J. CORP. L. 111, 112 (2002). 
 137. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2012). 
 138. Troy A. Paredes, Commissioner, SEC, Remarks at “The SEC Speaks in 2009” (Feb. 6, 
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch020609tap.htm. 
 
[A]s an agency, the SEC has limited resources. Even if the agency’s budget increases, we still 
will be faced with the challenge of allocating a finite number of people and funds. . . . [W]e 
must consider how the consequent allocation of resources compromises our ability to do other 
things that may more effectively advance our mission of protecting investors; maintaining 
fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitating capital formation. 
 
Id. 
 139. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l. 
 140. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 141. 15 U.S.C. § 77k. Section 11(a) provides: 
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on the omission or misstatement nor intent of the issuer.142 Damages are 
limited to the difference between the offering price and the price of the 
securities at the time of the suit.143 Purchasers also have a cause of action 
against the underwriter or any other parties who signed the registration 
statement,144 though these parties can claim a “due diligence” defense that 
they had no reason to believe the registration statement had a misstatement 
or omission. 145  A clear limitation on this cause of action is that only 
purchasers who acquired a security sold pursuant to a registration statement 
may bring claims. 
Although a registration statement is required for section 11, issuers who 
sell securities without registering them in violation of the securities laws 
may face liability under sections 5 and 12(a)(1).146 Purchasers have a cause 
of action against a seller who issues a non-exempt security without 
registering it.147 Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act creates liability for 
anyone who sells a security through a prospectus containing a material 
misrepresentation or omission. 148  The definition of “prospectus” is                                                                                                                  
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective, contained an 
untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated 
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring such 
security (unless it  is proved that at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or 
omission) may, either at law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue . . . 
 
enumerated parties, including those who signed the registration statement, directors of the issuer, 
accountants, and underwriters. Id. § 77k(a). 
 142. See id. § 77k.  An exception is that the presumption of reliance is rebutted if the plaintiff 
acquired the security more than twelve months after the effective date of the registration 
statement. Id. § 77k(a); see also Todd R. David et al., Heightened Pleading Requirements, Due 
Diligence, Reliance, Loss Causation, and Truth-On-The-Market—Available Defenses To Claims 
Under Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, 11 T RANSACTIONS: T ENN. J. BUS.  L. 53, 
68 (2010). 
 143. Id. § 77k(g). 
 144. Id. § 77k(a). 
 145. Id. § 77k(b)(3). 
 146. Id. §§ 77e, 77l(a)(1). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act provides: 
 
Any person who—offers or sells a security, whether or not exempted by the provisions of 
section 3, other than paragraphs (2) and (14) of subsection (a) thereof, by the use of any 
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the 
mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement 
of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in 
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not 
knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he 
did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or 
omission, shall be liable, subject to subsection (b), to the person purchasing such security 
from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to 
recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any 
income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer 
owns the securities.  
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extremely broad and includes nearly any communication that offers a 
security for sale.149 The purchaser must not know of the misstatement or 
omission at the time of the transaction.150 
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act is a key antifraud provision making 
it unlawful “to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” “obtain 
money or property” through misstatements or omissions, or “engage in any 
transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.”151  Although courts previously 
found an implied private right of action in section 17(a), that position has 
become more disfavored. 152  The SEC, however, continues to use this 
provision.153 
While the Securities Act and Exchange Act provide a backbone, more 
recent legislation has added to this body of law. In response to the 
accounting scandals at Enron and several other companies, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX Act) was passed with the goal of protecting 
investors by “improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate 
disclosures.”154 This law primarily concerns public companies, their board 
of directors and management, and their accounting firms;155  thus many 
small businesses would not be affected. The Dodd-Frank Act, however, 
affords a more recent and sweeping change of the legal landscape. Dodd-
Frank, signed just two years before the JOBS Act,156 ushered in a new era 
of financial regulation and undoubtedly increased government oversight of, 
and regulatory requirements for, companies that affect the financial stability 
of the United States. 157  These changes include the consolidation and 
creation of regulatory agencies, consumer protection reforms, and an 
increased availability of tools for financial crises.158 Perhaps the JOBS Act 
was a way to ensure that smaller companies would not be overburdened by 
the increased regulations of Dodd-Frank. When viewed in this light, the 
amount of regulation as a whole for capital raisers has increased, not 
decreased. 
                                                                                                                 
Id. § 77l(a)(2). 
 149. Id. § 77b(a)(10). 
 150. Id. § 77l(a)(2). 
 151. Id. § 77q(a). 
 152. 4 T HOMAS LEE HAZEN, T HE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.22 (6th ed. 2009). 
 153. See, e.g., SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 154. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, pmbl., 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 155. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211–20 (establishing the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board); id. §§ 78j-1(g)–(l) (regarding auditors); id. §§ 7241–44 (imposing obligations of corporate 
responsibility on officers and directors). 
 156. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012); Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 157. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 158. Id. 
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In addition to using federal securities laws, purchasers may be able to 
state a fraud claim under common law.159 This cause of action differs from 
state to state and often requires a plaintiff to prove eight or nine elements.160 
However, certain class action securities lawsuits may be preempted by 
federal law under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 
(SLUSA).161 
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE JOBS ACT AND SUPPLY-SIDE 
ECONOMICS ON EMPLOYMENT 
A. THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION LEADING UP TO THE JOBS ACT 
The American unemployment rate162 hit 4.4% in October of 2006—the 
lowest point in a decade.163  However, the recession officially began on 
December 1, 2007, 164  and in the spring of 2008, rising unemployment 
began to shed light on this fact.165 In October 2008, President Bush signed a 
$700 billion bailout of the financial system through the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which established the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP).166 President Obama then signed an $831 billion                                                                                                                  
 159. Joshua D. Ratner, Stockholders’ Holding Claim Class Actions Under State Law After the 
Uniform Standards Act Of 1998, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1035, 1037 (2001). 
 160. Douglas M. Branson, Securities Litigation In State Courts— Something Old, Something 
New, Something Borrowed . . . ., 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 509, 512 (1998); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF T ORTS § 531 (1977) (“One who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to 
liability to the persons or class of persons whom he intends or has reason to expect to act or to 
refrain from action in reliance upon the misrepresentation, for pecuniary loss suffered by them 
through their justifiable reliance in the type of transaction in which he intends or has reason to 
expect their conduct to be influenced.”). 
 161. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f) (2012); see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 
547 U.S. 71 (2006) (addressin g the issue of the scope of SLUSA’s “ in connection with” 
language); Elizabeth C. Schauber, Note, Developing a Precise Definition: The Fifth Circuit 
Addresses the Scope of the “In Connection With” Requirement Under SLUSA, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. 
FIN. & COM.  L. 561 (2013) (exploring and endorsing the Fifth Circuit’s adoption of the Ninth 
Circuit’s more than tangentially related SLUSA standard in Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503 (5th 
Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 978 (Jan. 18, 2013) (No. 12-88), which is currently before the 
Supreme Court on appeal). 
 162. Persons are considered unemployed “if they do not have a job, have actively looked for 
work in the prior 4 weeks, and are currently available for work.” Labor Force Statistics from the 
Current Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STA T. http://data.bls.gov/timeseries 
/LNS14000000 (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Labor Force Statistics]. As a result , the 
category does not include those who are underemployed or not currently seeking employment. 
 163. Id. The unemployment rate reached 4.4% again in December  2006, March 2007, and May 
2007. Id. 
 164. Determination of the December 2007 Peak in Economic Activity, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. 
RES., http://www.nber.org/dec2008.pdf (last modified Dec. 11, 2008). 
 165. Michael M. Grynbaum, Unemployment Rate Rises After 80,000 Jobs Cut, N.Y. T IMES 
(Apr. 4, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/04/business/04cnd-econ.html. 
 166. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201–61) (2012)). As of May 2013, the Congressional 
Budget Office estimated that $428 billion of the originally authorized $700 billion would be paid 
to TARP. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REPORT ON THE T ROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM—MAY 
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stimulus package known as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009. 167  The stimulus included tax cuts, extended unemployment 
benefits, and direct investments in infrastructure.168 Despite these efforts, 
the unemployment rate reached 10% in October 2009 and was 8.1% in 
April 2012 when the JOBS Act was passed.169 
B. DEREGULATION AS A TOOL AGAINST UNEMPLOYMENT 
The stated purpose of passing the JOBS Act, as the title suggests, was 
to create jobs.170 The sponsors of the Act contended that allowing small 
businesses to avoid regulations while raising capital would have the effect 
of those enterprisers hiring a larger workforce. 171  The assertion that 
businesses need access to capital is not subject to much debate. A report to 
the President noted that “[e]conomists have modeled a link between the 
supply of credit and macroeconomic activity” and that “[c]redit conditions 
have been shown to affect a variety of specific macroeconomic outcomes, 
including investment spending, inventories, and economic growth and 
development.”172 However, another link in the chain is needed to get from 
general economic growth to increased employment.  
Proponents of the JOBS Act assert that decreasing the amount of 
regulations that companies face will increase hiring. 173  Instituting 
deregulation in an attempt to increase economic activity is part of a strategy 
known as supply-side economics. 174  This approach is achieved mainly 
through lower marginal tax rates, which in turn increases after-tax returns                                                                                                                  
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on labor and investment. 175  The increased supply is thought to have a 
“trickle down” effect.176 The broader policy mix of supply-side economic 
theory asserts that, besides lower tax rates, free trade and decreased 
regulation are key to economic growth. 177  Many economists, however, 
disagree with the ability of a deregulatory policy to increase economic 
growth in general and doubt it can create a positive effect on employment 
specifically.178 
While it is true that securities regulations create barriers to capital 
access for small businesses, these enterprises frequently cite to other 
problems as having a higher priority. 179 In a 2012 survey, small business 
owners ranked “cost of health insurance” and “uncertainty over economic 
conditions” as their top two problems, with “unreasonable government 
regulations” ranked fifth.180 As a category, tax concerns ranked higher than 
regulatory concerns,181 suggesting that taxes are increasingly complex and 
more costly to deal with than regulations. But lowering taxes may not have 
the impact on employment that some policy makers expect. The Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities noted that “[s]mall business employment rose 
by an average of 2.3 percent (756,000 jobs) per year during the Clinton 
years, when tax rates for high-income filers were set at very similar levels 
to those that would be reinstated under President Obama’s budget.”182 
However, during the Bush administration, when the tax rates were lower, 
“employment rose by just 1.0 percent (367,000 jobs).”183 
Admittedly, while these responses suggest that taxes are more of a 
priority than regulations, government intrusion clearly still plays a role in 
decision-making and attempts at growth in small businesses. One reason is 
that it costs small businesses more per employee to comply with federal 
regulations than larger firms.184 Although regulations are a concern of small                                                                                                                  
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business owners, statistical analysis suggests that government regulation 
does not have the effect on employment that the Act’s sponsors claimed.185 
Numbers from the Congressional Budget Office estimate that in 2011, only 
0.4% of jobs lost were due to “government regulation/intervention.”186 
Moreover, economists and policy makers, even those who once championed 
deregulation, have begun to reverse position. Bruce Bartlett, a former 
economist to the Reagan administration, recently claimed the idea that 
deregulation would lead to significant job growth is “just nonsense. It’s just 
made up.”187 
V. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY: THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN SPECIAL INTERESTS AND ECONOMIC THEORY 
In the first presidential debate of 2012, President Obama stood by his 
position that the financial system lacked sufficient control prior to the 
recession: “Does anybody out there think that the big problem we had is 
that there was too much oversight and regulation of Wall Street? Because if 
you do, then Governor Romney is your candidate. But that’s not what I 
believe.”188 Yet just six months prior to making this statement, the President 
signed a JOBS Act that was described as one which was “premised on the 
dangerous and discredited notion that the way to create jobs is to weaken 
regulatory protections.”189 This conundrum can be partially understood by 
analyzing the various interests that went into the JOBS Act. Although the 
surface of this analysis seems to point to a balance between access to 
capital, job creation, and investor protection, several other interests came 
into play with the passage of the JOBS Act. The Act was as much a creature 
of politics as economic theory. 
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“Political economy” is defined as “[t]he study and use of how economic 
theory and methods influences political ideology.”190 This discipline covers 
a broad group of competing interests because various individuals and 
groups are often competing for a finite number of resources.191  Because 
competing groups have different interests and yield influence in various 
ways, there often seems to be a disconnect between economic theory and 
politics.192 So what explanations account for the Act’s passage, and which 
groups benefited? 
One possible explanation is that Republicans simply pushed a bill 
through to further their goal of deregulation. Jesse Rothstein, an economics 
professor at the University of California, Berkeley, believed that “[i]t’s 
game playing to try to pretend like they’re doing something” and “they 
know they have to put up something that has the label ‘job creation’ on it, 
whether or not it would work.”193 Republicans pushed a similar package of 
jobs bills in the months leading up to the 2012 election, and many of these 
were aimed at reducing environmental regulations, analogous to the 
securities regulations that were relaxed through the JOBS Act.194  This 
suggests that the JOBS Act may have been part of a broader partisan 
strategy of deregulation. 
However, this view may be too cynical and even hints at deceptiveness 
on the part of politicians. While the two-party system of the American 
legislative branch often leads to partisan conflict,195 the role of politics and 
of special interests is to allow for the representation of parties who hold 
differing views on the role of government and the extent of free-market 
capitalism. At the same time, politicians understand the give-and-take 
nature of negotiations and must often compromise to further their ultimate 
goals.196 An inquiry into the different groups served by the JOBS Act and 
the overall political landscape provides more clues.                                                                                                                  
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One such party-in-interest was the labor movement, which—one would 
think—ordinarily favors laws aimed at increasing employment. However, 
the nation’s largest labor organizations were opposed to the Act’s 
passage.197 The American Federation of Labor asked Congress “to set aside 
the politics of the 1%, the old game of special favors for Wall Street, and 
turn to the business of real job creation. The labor movement strongly 
opposes the JOBS Act and any other effort to weaken the Dodd-Frank 
Act.”198 
And deceptiveness does not seem present as Republican politicians, for 
their part, made no effort to disguise their agenda of rolling back 
regulations imposed by Dodd-Frank.199 Thus, as mentioned in Part III.B, 
perhaps the purpose of this deregulation was to assist small businesses that 
may be overburdened by costly laws and rules. As outlined in Part IV.B, 
federal regulations are usually more costly for small businesses because of 
the economies of scale.200 
One particularly noteworthy subset of small businesses is technology 
startups. As manufacturing jobs continue to be outsourced to emerging 
economies,201  Silicon Valley continues to play an increasingly important 
role in U.S. economic growth. 202 But after the recessions of 2001 and 2008, 
increased regulations that were perhaps unwarranted may have impacted the 
industry. 203  The JOBS Act, therefore, may have been an attempt for 
Congress and Obama to win back the technology sector, which is driven in 
large part by small start-ups. Even larger technology companies like Google 
welcomed the new law.204 
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A reason for this attempt at “winning back” certain sectors of business 
has to do with the negotiation aspect of politics mentioned above.205 These 
events all transpired during an election year. In effect, Obama and his 
Democratic supporters may also be a beneficiary of the JOBS Act, albeit 
indirectly. 
CONCLUSION 
Employment has been at the forefront of political and economic debate 
as a result of the recent recession. The JOBS Act was passed with the 
express purpose of increasing employment. As commentators and 
representatives of various industries assailed the new legislation as 
dangerous to investor protection, many did not see the simple truth directly 
in front of them: the act may not fulfill its purpose of creating jobs.206 Some 
other areas of the law seem not to add up as well. One example discussed 
was that while many think allowing hedge funds to no longer face a ban on 
general solicitation will harm investors, others think the industry will not be 
affected.207  Additionally, companies are choosing to go beyond what is 
necessary when disclosing to investors because they know the entity’s value 
will increase.208  
While safeguarding investors is important, it must be balanced against 
other policy interests. The SEC, in its own mission statement, declares that 
its purpose is to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient 
markets, and facilitate capital formation.”209 On top of these public policy 
concerns, unemployment continues to hurt many citizens.  As a result, the 
government should continue efforts to increase employment. However, 
having too many interests involved with the passage of this law has turned 
it into what will amount to an unsuccessful attempt at job creation. At the 
same time, the JOBS Act will likely not harm investors to the extent many 
commentators believed. 
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